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News report: TV station says Miami-Dade Fire Rescue ‘did virtually nothing to discipline’ captain who went on tirade against videographer. Calls it a ‘cover up’.

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Previous coverage here & here 

Analysis from FireLawBlog.com’s Curt Varone

We first showed the video below involving Miami-Dade Fire Rescue Captain Greg Smart on March 22, the day after the incident occurred. Since that time a lot of people have been wondering about the outcome of the department’s investigation into Captain Smart’s aggressive behavior toward videographer Taylor Hardy. According to WFOR-TV in Miami, Captain Smart received his disciplinary action a month ago but nobody bothered to let Hardy or the public know the outcome. WFOR-TV reports “the department did virtually nothing to Smart.”

What I find disturbing about all of this is not so much the issue of what discipline there was for Captain Smart. Instead it’s a lack of a clear message from Miami-Dade Fire Rescue. In looking at all of the coverage then and now, no one has acknowledged that it is okay for the public to take pictures from a public place and it’s not okay for firefighters to interfere with that First Amendment right. And if that isn’t the case, shouldn’t the leadership at Miami-Dade Fire Rescue explain their interpretation of the? This lack of clarity with such a high profile video probably sends the wrong message to the public and to other firefighters.

The video report above describes in detail what the TV station discovered. Here are some excerpts:

… a close review of the report, written by Chief P.O. Albury, reveals efforts to cover up Smart’s actions.

Hardy filed a complaint that Smart was trying to prevent him from recording at the scene. Albury said that charge was “not sustained” because “at no time did Capt Smart state that the complainant couldn’t film.”

In other words, since Smart did not actually say the words “you can not videotape here” he was found innocent of the charge.

Albury’s report neglects the fact that there was another firefighter standing with Smart who explicitly told Hardy he wasn’t allowed to videotape. It also neglects that Smart told Hardy: “You are leaving right now, turn around and walk away. You are leaving right now.” Nor does it note that Smart attempted to block Hardy’s video with his chest.

Albury did sustain a complaint that Smart’s behavior was “unprofessional.” Albury wrote: “Capt Smart responded poorly when the bystander refused to back out of the safety perimeter.”

But Albury excused the behavior noting that Smart was under a great deal of stress. “I have coached Capt Smart reference this event,” Albury wrote. “He was under a great deal of stress on this call and acted in an aggressive nature when challenged by the bystander. I feel that he and I have come to an understanding as to the expected behavior when dealing with the public. Capt Smart agrees that he overreacted and caused embarrassment not only to himself but to the department. I feel that in the future he will have a different perspective as to how we need to act regardless of the severity of the call.”

Nowhere in the investigation by Albury does it address Smart’s use of the radio to demand police units respond on an emergency basis.

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Report released: PGFD Safety Investigation Team looks at Riverdale Heights, MD fire that injured 7 firefighters.

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Previous coverage of this fire

Read entire report

Maryland’s Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department is holding a briefing for the press this afternoon on the release of its Safety Investigative Team Report into the February 24, 2012 fire in Riverdale Heights that injured seven firefighters. The executive summary is below and you can click here to read the entire 300 page report. News coverage of today’s event will be added when available.

Executive Summary 

On February 24, 2012, at 2111 hours, Prince George’s County Fire/Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Department personnel responded to a structure fire at 6404 57th Avenue in Riverdale Heights, Maryland. Upon arrival, Fire/EMS Department personnel observed flames extending out of a basement window, pressurized smoke on the first floor, and high winds impacting the rear of the structure.  

Shortly after arriving, firefighters forced the front door of the structure, which immediately changed the fire’s flow path and dynamics by adding a ventilation opening above the fire. This situation was intensified by weather conditions (high winds impacting the rear of the structure). Firefighters entered the structure through the front door, placing themselves above the basement fire and in its outflow path. This exposed them to high velocity and high temperature gases.  

Two (2) firefighters were trapped on the first floor without the protection of a hose line, when the front door shut behind them and changed the fire’s flow path. The hot smoke and gases that were coming up the interior stairwell and escaping out the front door were now contained to the first floor. This dropped the smoke layer to the floor and temporarily increased the temperatures from floor to ceiling in the front room where the firefighters were trapped. One (1) firefighter was able to self-rescue through a front window and the other firefighter was removed through the front door by other firefighters. The fire in the basement was burning unchecked, until an engine company entered the basement from the rear of the structure and began putting water on the fire.

Ultimately seven (7) firefighters were injured; the two (2) firefighters that were trapped on the first floor sustained the most significant injuries. There have been several documented incidents in the County, as well as nationally, with similar concerning tactics and operations, that have injured or killed firefighters, such as DCFD Cherry Road LODD[1], SFFD Diamond Heights LODD[2], and BCoFD Dowling Circle LODD[3].

This makes the recommendations of this report vitally important.   

The Safety Investigation Team (Team) visited the scene, reviewed statements, conducted interviews, and gathered data during the course of the investigation. The Team identified many factors that contributed to the outcome and injuries to the firefighters. While the report details all of these factors, the Team identified the following as most critical:  

  1. An effective size-up was not completed, including a 360-degree survey walk around the building, as well as evaluating environmental conditions.
  2. No incident action plan was communicated, and firefighters were dangerously positioned above and in the outflow path of the fire.
  3. A firefighter emergency occurred, but no MAYDAY was effectively communicated.
  4. Multiple existing policies and procedures were not followed.
  5. Training deficiencies were identified at all levels.
  6. Command, control, and accountability deficiencies were identified at all levels.  

While the Team analyzed the entire incident, the focus of this investigation was to determine what happened, what factors led to the injuries and, most importantly, what recommendations should be made so future incidents do not have similar or worse outcomes. During the course of the investigation, the Team prepared many recommendations intended to assist the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department in improving the operational safety of personnel, fireground operations, command and control of fire incidents, as well as training. These recommendations, which are listed throughout the report, are separated into categories termed: immediate (red – Life safety & firefighter survival), short term (yellow – Relatively easy to implement), and long term (green – May require significant planning including fiscal impacts). A complete list of all recommendations is provided in Appendix 1.

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Internal report: Fire trucks & ambulance went wrong way to double fatal fire in Myersville, MD.

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AP:

One fire truck went the wrong way and got stuck trying to turn around. Another raced to a wrong address. And an ambulance crew blindly followed first one fire engine and then the other instead of checking directions to a burning house.

The bungled response by two volunteer fire companies didn’t cause the deaths of two little girls who perished in the ferocious blaze Jan. 31 in a rural subdivision near Myersville, but it revealed communication failures that must be addressed, a Frederick County emergency services official says.

“There’s a lot of lessons,” Fire and Rescue Services Division Director Tom Owens told The Frederick News-Post (http://bit.ly/14QalCM ). The newspaper reported Thursday on the agency’s written analysis of the incident. 

Madigan Lillard, 3, and her 6-year-old sister Sophie died of smoke inhalation in the blaze. Four other family members received medical care, including 8-year-old Morgan, who spent eight days in a burn unit at Children’s National Medical Center in Washington.

Their house near the base of South Mountain, about 55 miles west of Baltimore, was destroyed in the accidental fire. The blaze began when drapes came in contact with a baseboard heater, investigators found.

County officials said the fire and ambulance crews should have grabbed printed directions to the fire or consulted maps in their vehicles. Owens said his agency is moving some dispatch printers from firehouse offices to spots more readily accessible to firefighters in a hurry.

Fire and Rescue Services spokesman Michael Dmuchowski said it’s not clear why the Myersville Volunteer Fire Company fire engine didn’t take the most direct route to the fire, about three miles away. Instead it took an indirect route, missed a turn and got stuck trying turn around. A tow truck was summoned and the engine arrived at the fire on Highland Avenue at 12:25 a.m., 65 minutes after it was dispatched.

The report was more critical of a Middletown Volunteer Fire Department crew that turned onto similarly named Highland Court and laid out a fire hose before realizing the burning house, though visible, was on another street. The error cost them several minutes in getting in position to fight the fire. The report attributed the mistake to “tunnel vision” by the excited crew. Their leader should have looked at a map, the report said.

The report faulted the ambulance crew, part of the Myersville company, for “blindly” following the Myersville engine and then the Middletown truck instead of relying on their own printed directions. The same ambulance got blocked in at the fire scene and couldn’t transport a patient until several other vehicles were moved, the report said.

Dmuchowski said officials are trying to determine whether any disciplinary action is needed.

Owens said the problems didn’t prevent a rescue of the trapped girls, the only people left inside when firefighters arrived to find the second floor of the burning house almost completely collapsed.

“When you compare it with the pre-arrival photographs, how intense, how rapidly the fire had spread, even before 911 was called, and what the autopsy revealed about the cause of death, when you put all those things together, we do not believe that the outcome would have been any different,” Owens said.

The girls’ aunt, Becky Lillard Pomato, declined to comment Thursday on the report. She said the family is focusing on healing and building a playground park as a memorial to Sophie and Madigan.

Copyright 2013 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

Brian Englar, Frederick News Post

Myersville Engine 82 turned from U.S. 40 onto Hollow Road after overshooting Harmony Road, which intersects Highland Avenue.

The engine became stuck trying to turn around and a heavy-duty tow truck was called to remove it. The engine arrived at 12:25 a.m., 65 minutes after it was dispatched.

Ambulance 89 followed Engine 82 until the crew realized they were heading in the wrong direction and followed Middletown Engine 72 to the scene. Engine 72 briefly went to the wrong location at 11:28 p.m. when it turned on Highland Court. The crew had laid out their supply line before realizing they were on the wrong street. Engine 72′s error caused a delay of several minutes getting in position to fight the fire, the report states.

“There is no excuse for responding to an incorrect location when the CAD (computer-aided dispatch) printer is working properly and they can get a copy of the printed location prior to response,” the report states. “The county is looking into printing more than one copy of the CAD information when stations are alerted for multiple unit response so all units can have a copy, not just one.”

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UPDATE – IG report on reserve fleet has columnist again asking what did the fire chief know & when did he know it?

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DC Breaking Local News Weather Sports FOX 5 WTTG

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Coverage of Chief Ellerbe & DC Fire & EMS Department

Click here to read entire OIG report

Much has been made in recent weeks about the readiness of the reserve fleet of fire trucks and ambulances operated by the DC Fire & EMS Department. Yesterday the DC Office of the Inspector General posted its report titled “Deficiencies Observed in the Repair and Readiness of Reserve Vehicles”. It does not paint a pretty picture on the department’s state of readiness.

It was sent to Mayor Vincent Gray yesterday. The fire department has had it, according to the cover letter, since February 19.

Alan Suderman, AKA Loose Lips at the Washington City Paper, uses the report to revisit the theme of what did the fire chief know and when did he know it? (previous Loose Lips column about timeline):

On Feb. 19, Ellerbe received an initial management alert report from the Office of the Inspector General saying that “many vehicles designated as reserve vehicles were out-of-service and could not be used if needed as frontline replacement vehicles in neighborhood fire stations, or for large-scale emergencies or mass casualty events.”

A day later, Ellerbe testified before the Council’s public safety committee and made no mention that the information about the reserve fleet he submitted may have been inaccurate.

On March 13, Fox 5′s Paul Wagner reported on allegations made by the fire fighters union that the department was improperly counting fire trucks that had been sold or been out of service for years as part of the department’s reserve fleet. Right after the story aired, Ellerbe put out a statement saying the union was right and thanking it for “bringing this inaccurate information to our attention.”

Council member Tommy Wells, whose committee received the bad information, told Suderman he is going to give Chief Ellerbe a chance to explain the timeline but said it “does not look good”.  No response from the chief on this issue.

There is more on this angle from the AP via The Washington Post:

But the inspector general’s report, which highlights some of the same deficiencies in the reserve fleet, was delivered to the fire chief the day before the hearing. It was released to the public on Friday.

“It certainly undermines my confidence in the management of the fire department,” said Councilmember Tommy Wells, who chairs the council’s public safety committee and presided over the hearing. “If they used the information that they provided me that said the reserve trucks are available when they’re not even in the District of Columbia and we don’t even own them anymore, then that tells me there’s a massive breakdown of administrative competence.”

Ellerbe said in a statement that he was already implementing the report’s recommendations and that the department was in the process of purchasing new vehicles, including ladder trucks and ambulances.

Paul Wagner, WTTG-TV/Fox 5:

A new report by the D.C. inspector general is painting a dim picture of the readiness of the D.C. fire department and questions whether it can answer the call in a mass casualty incident.

The report found major deficiencies in the reserve fleet of trucks, pumpers and transports, and describes a dysfunctional operation.

This report, which was given to Chief Kenneth Ellerbe on February 19, the day before he appeared in front the D.C. City Council, says the department had not come close to meeting its own emergency plans and many of the vehicles designated as reserves were listed as out of service.

The report slams the condition of the fleet and questions the quality of the repairs it receives.

The investigation into the fleet and its maintenance began in January of last year when an inspector took a look inside a warehouse on Gallatin Street in Northwest D.C.

Inside, according to the report, were supposed to be ten reserve engines, eight reserve ladder trucks and two reserve rescue squads.

Instead, the report says the investigator found two engines that would not start, a ladder truck that would not start, and one being worked on in the driveway.

As for the rescue squads — there were three – but one that wouldn’t start.

The report also says the department’s emergency plan calls for 12 battalion reserve engines. But over the course of the seven-month investigation, the most ever listed was five.

The ambulances were another matter. Of the 31 listed in reserve, at times there were none, at other times there were just two, and the most the investigator found were 14.

On Thursday when FOX 5 asked the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety about the ladder trucks in reserve and the readiness of the fleet, this is what he had to say.

“I received a report recently that we have a reserve fleet,” said Paul Quander. “And I don’t mind going out with you. And if we need to count one by one, we count one by one. I think that’s the best way to put this matter to issue. If it’s there, it’s there. If it’s not, it’s not. Let’s go and see. Let’s go and count.”

It’s unclear if Quander had seen this report at the time of our interview. The inspector general says it was emailed on March 21.

The report goes on to say, “The limited documentation available and the overwhelming sentiment expressed to the OIG team by employees at all levels indicate that such deficiencies are real and negatively impact the day to day availability of both frontline vehicles at many fire stations and the vehicles in reserve status designated to replace them.”

“There is no planning,” said Union President Ed Smith. “It’s all fly by the seat of your pants and the citizens are suffering and my members are put at risk every day when they get out there on the rigs.”

A week ago Wednesday, FOX 5 first reported the union’s claim the reserve numbers given to the D.C. City Council in February were false and that apparatus claimed as in the reserve fleet had actually been sold or placed out of service.

Later that night, Chief Ellerbe issued a press release thanking the union for bringing the issue to light.

“It is poor management at the top and it alludes to that in this report,” said Smith.

One of the more eye opening facts in the report points out that Truck 3, the tower truck that would be first due to the White House, was repaired 138 times from January of 2009 to May of 2012. It is a number the inspector general decided to highlight.

Chief Ellerbe answered the report with a press release saying the department was already moving ahead with the recommendations of the inspector general and would report back in 60 days.

What’s going on in Florida? Scathing reports about Flagler Beach & Miami Beach fire departments.

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Read the entire Flagler Beach report

I know there are some very good things going on in the fire service in Florida, but that’s being overshadowed right now by some rather ugly news published online yesterday about two beach departments 300 miles apart. Reading the outrageous nature of charges leveled in the two separate reports you almost have to wonder if there is something in the waters of the Atlantic Ocean that’s causing this.

Click here and you can read the article by Miami New Times News claiming a lengthy investigation uncovered significant corruption and bribery in inspections, millions of dollars of missing fire permit fees, serious misconduct by a union official, sexual misconduct and racial abuse in the City of Miami Beach Fire Rescue Department. For a summary of the issues check out what Rhett Fleitz has written at FireCritic.com

The other story is a follow-up to the one we told you about a month ago at the Flagler Beach Fire Department. You may recall Fire Chief Martin Roberts, an assistant chief, captain and firefighter have been on suspension after allegations they had been drinking moonshine and beer in the firehouse and some of them had responded on a fire call. The incidents occurred in December.

An independent investigation was ordered and the attorney who conducted it has issued a report that goes beyond the drinking. It describes an ugly civil war between two fire department factions. You can read the entire report here. For a summary check out the article at FlaglerBeachLive.com. An excerpt is below:

The investigation sustains allegations that the firefighters and the chief drank on the job.

But more critically for the department and the city as a whole, the investigative report reveals a severely dysfunctional fire department: it is divided by two cliques that appear to be at war with each other and causing “a high degree of intra-departmental discord.”

The investigation also and incidentally reveals that a Flagler County Sheriff’s lieutenant, Greg Weston, had cooked a home-made, 100-proof alcoholic brew similar to, but not quite, moonshine, and sold it to to Jacob Bissonnette, one of Flagler Beach’s firefighters, in the station’s parking lot.

The investigation, conducted by Daniel Langley of Fishback Dominick, a Winter Park law firm, and concluded on Jan. 31, centers on Roberts, Assistant Chief Shane Wood, Captain Steve Wood (Shane’s father), and Jacob Bissonnette. It finds that all four broke the city’s zero-tolerance policy on drinking. Roberts and Steve Wood did so, according to the findings, by drinking at a party then responding to a fire, and driving city-owned equipment, including a tower truck in Wood’s case. Roberts also violated a city ordinance by authorizing Wood to respond to the fire. Bissonnette and Shane Wood were found in violation for having possessed alcohol at the fire station, “on city compensated time,” and drinking there. All four were found to conduct themselves in a way “unbecoming” of their position. 

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Arbitrator rules DC fire union prez unlawfully transferred by chief. Capt. Ed Smith says Kenneth Ellerbe ‘is about retaliation’.

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Two battalion chiefs go public with claims of retaliation & intimidation by Chief Ellerbe

IAFF Local 36 press release

Read the decision from arbitrator Leonard Wagman

Capt. Ed Smith, president of IAFF Local 36, told reporters Andrea Noble and Matthew Cella of The Washington Times, “It’s not about me, it’s about the union as an organization and our protective  rights.” The comment came following a recent arbitrator’s ruling that Capt. Smith was unlawfully retaliated against by DC Fire & EMS Department Chief Kenneth Ellerbe when Smith was suddenly transferred from Rescue Squad 1 to Engine 7 in July 2011.

Last Friday FireLawBlog.com’s Curt Varone first published the 29-page report from the arbitrator. Now the reporters have interiewed the union president and attempted unsuccessfully to get comments from Chief Ellerbe.

Arbitrator Leonard Wagman with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service wrote the report. Here are some excerpts based on Wagman’s findings following the testimony from Smith, Ellerbe and others:

I find that Chief Ellerbe’s and the Department’s responses to Captain Smith’s request for an explanation were evasive, amounting to a statement that “we did it because we can.”

I find that the real reason was to retaliate against Captain Smith for engaging in union activity as president of Local  36, the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the Department’s  employees.

In his efforts to come up with a lawful explanation for his decision to transfer Captain Smith, Chief Ellerbe hastened to Smith’s firehouse on Sunday, July 3, in the midst of the Independence Day weekend, to search for some flaw in  the Captain’s performance of duty

In its effort to escape a finding that its decision to transfer Captain Smith was motivated by his protected union activity the Department has gone from evasion to shifting reasons for its conduct.

The article brings up other instances where DC Fire & EMS Department officers have claimed retaliation by the chief. These include the cases of Lt. Robert Alvarado, Battalion Chief Richard Sterne and Battalion Chief Kevin Sloan. More from The Washington Times:

While the ruling in Capt. Smith’s case  illustrates the most clear-cut charge of retaliation by the fire chief that has  been upheld, other firefighters have made similar complaints about retaliatory  behavior.

The arbitrator’s ruling in Capt. Smith  lends more credibility to the other complaints, Capt. Smith said.

“It’s solidified all these complaints on the chief,” he said. “They have been  upheld by a third-party arbitrator. He is about retaliation.”

Read entire article from The Washington Times

Sgt. John Michael Carter, DCFD, died 15-years-ago today. Killed in corner grocery fire at 400 Kennedy Street, NW.

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2010 BackstepFirefighter.com article by Dave LeBlanc on 400 Kennedy Street, NW

IAFF’s Rich Duffy on the anniversary of the death of John Carter

IAFF Local 36 Capital City Firefighter Special Edition

Read DCFD report into death of Sergeant John Carter

Fifteen-years-ago this morning DCFD Sergeant John Michael Carter failed to make it out of a fire in a small corner grocery at 400 Kennedy Street in Northwest Washington. Sergeant Carter had fallen into the basement as his crew left the building. Today, our thoughts are with the family and many friends of John Carter.

I knew John Carter, but not extremely well. More of a passing, “Hi, how are you?” and a few words on a fireground or a wave, as he did shortly before his death during a visit to the TV station where I worked. But I learned all about John Carter two days after he was gone and it was one of the more unforgettable experiences in 38-years of covering news.

Photo of 400 Kennedy Street, NW by Dave J. Iannone. Click here for more images.

On Sunday morning, October 26, 1997, IAFF Local 36 Vice President Kenny Cox called and said that Debbie Carter wanted to do an interview with me about her husband. It was a surprise because, out of respect, we were keeping our distance and I hadn’t even requested an interview. But I consider it one of the great honors of my life to get that call.

To this day, my friend videographer Greg Guise and I are still in awe of what we witnessed. Despite this unbelievable loss occurring just two days earlier, Debbie sat perfectly composed telling us about her husband. She was not going to let tears get in the way of letting everyone know who John Carter was. There was even a proud smile on her face at times as she talked about John Carter, the firefighter, father and husband.

Photo by Dave Iannone.

But it was hard for anyone who saw the story not to shed some tears when we heard Debbie say how happy she was that very early on a chilly Friday morning she decided to get out of bed and walk out of their Maryland home to give her husband a kiss as he headed off to what turned out to be his final shift. What a lesson for us all.

I’ve said it many, many times since that interview and I will say it again. We should all be as fortunate as John Carter was to have someone speak so eloquently on our behalf once we are gone.

Unfortunately because of a change in servers at WUSA9.com a few years back, that entire interview is no longer available online. But below is a story the station did two-years-ago about a scholarship for John and Debbie’s son Brian. Brian was just eight-years-old when his dad died. In the story is a small excerpt from that 1997 interview.

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NIOSH report: Zachary Whitacre, Virginia firefighter who fell off rear step of tanker headed to fill site at West Virginia fire. Father was driving rig.

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Previous STATter911.com coverage of this story

Read entire NIOSH report

On February 13, 2011, 21-year-old Firefighter Zachary Whitacre fell off the tail board of Gore Volunteer Fire & Rescue Department Tanker 14 when the rig spun out of control on ice and crashed while heading to refill during a house fire in Capon Bridge, West Virginia. Whitacre’s father Donald was driving Tanker 14 when the accident occurred. NIOSH released it’s report today. Below are a summary of the findings:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On February 13, 2012, a 21-year-old male volunteer fire fighter (victim) died after falling from the tailboard of a fire department tanker (Tanker 14). The victim, acting as a spotter and using the driver’s side mirror, had successfully guided the driver in backing the tanker to position its tailboard near the dump tank. The driver of Tanker 14 stayed in the driver’s seat and watched the water gauge indicator lights on the pump panel through his side mirror.

The victim, located on the tailboard, operated the dump valve to fill the folding tank. When the driver saw the tank-empty light flash, he left the fire scene to go to the water source to refill the tanker.

Unknown to the Tanker 14 driver, another tanker (Tanker 9) had inadvertently dropped approximately 1,500 gallons of water on the roadway while also responding to the incident. Tanker 9 had reported the inadvertent drop to their dispatcher, but Tanker 14 had not heard this communication. As Tanker 14 traveled this same roadway en route to the water source, it hit a patch of black ice that had resulted from the inadvertent water drop. The Tanker 14 driver lost control and the tanker spun around a number of times before impacting a berm on the shoulder of the roadway (see Photo 1 and Photo 2). The Tanker 14 driver was injured but was able to radio for help and crawl out of the passenger side door. The driver then saw the victim lying unresponsive in the roadway. A rescue unit from the fire scene responded to the crash along with other units and emergency medical aid was performed. The victim was taken to a local hospital where he died from his injuries.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

  • Failure to check the apparatus before leaving the scene (driver walk-around)
  • Inadequate communications between the driver and victim
  • Unintentional discharge of water onto roadway in freezing conditions
  • Ice on roadway
  • Fire department communication interoperability.

KEY RECCOMENDATIONS

  • Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are properly trained to ensure that the apparatus is ready for the road before leaving the fire scene (including a driver walk-around)
  • Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are properly trained and equipped to communicate task-level functions
  • Fire departments should ensure that fire department driver/operators are trained in techniques for maintaining control of their vehicle at all times
  • Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters from different departments can communicate with each other via radio
  • Fire departments should consider installing rear view camera(s) with monitor(s) inside the cab
  • Fire apparatus manufacturers should use engineering controls (such as electronic lockouts and engineering guards) to ensure that water dump valves cannot activate unintentionally.

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Final report: Ashevlle FD investigation into the death of Captain Jeff Bowen.

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Click here to download entire report

Our friends at FireNews.net have alerted us to the release of the City of Asheville (NC) Fire Department’s line of duty death report looking at the July 28, 2011 fire at 445 Biltmore Avenue that took the life of Captain Jeffrey Scott Bowen.

Chief Scott Burnette talked about some of the changes for the department outlined in the report.

Julie Ball, Citizens-Times.com:

Chief Scott Burnette reviewed some of the changes the department has planned during a presentation for City Council’s Public Safety Committee on Monday.

The chief also released the department’s 522-page internal report on the Biltmore Avenue fire that killed Capt. Jeff Bowen in July of last year.

“It is our hope that the lessons learned from the fire at 445 Biltmore Ave. will create positive improvements in the fire service as a whole,” Burnette said in a letter included with the report.

Emily Pace, WSPA-TV:

“We have sent every one of our firefighters through a rapid intervention team certification course,” said Burnette.

The new course is required by the state of North Carolina and teaches crews how to rescue a firefighter in trouble.

Burnette hopes it will help prevent another tragic loss.  

“We have also added an extra fire engine to structure fire responses, so that way we can make sure we have enough personnel to serve as a rescue team,” adds Burnette. 

Other links:

Read NIOSH report

The loss of Captain Jeff Bowen, the inside story from Firefighter Jay Bettencourt Part 1

The loss of Captain Jeff Bowen, the inside story from Firefighter Jay Bettencourt Part 2

Earlier coverage of this fire here, here & here

Firefighter Jay Bettencourt receives firefighter of the year

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UPDATED: Berlin, MD cuts all funds to volunteer fire company. Cites hostile work conditions including homosexual slurs against career medics. VFC says it’s a control issue.

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Image from Berlin Fire Company website.

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Newspaper editorial supports town’s position

Today the town of Berlin, in Worcester County on Maryland’s Eastern Shore, announced it was cutting ties and stopping all financial aid to the Berlin Fire Company. The monetary loss is about $600,000 or a third of the fire company’s budget. The issue, according to news reports, is a long brewing battle over continued charges of a hostile work environment, discrimination and sexual harassment against career EMS employees assigned to the firehouse.

Mayor Gee Williams told reporters the town would not be a part of this “culture of intolerance and ignorance”.  The department’s attorney says the real issue is one of control and not sexual harassment.

Shawn J. Soper, mdcoastdispatch.com (this is a lengthy article with additional background information):

The Berlin Mayor and Council on Tuesday announced it will amend its fiscal year 2013 budget to cease all financial aid to the BFC as a result of the organization’s inability to accept basic requirements of the town’s personnel policies to eliminate workplace harassment based on sexual orientation, race and sex of paid emergency medical services (EMS) employees at the Berlin Fire House. The funding support is also being withdrawn from the budget because the BFC has allegedly seriously breached the terms of an employment agreement for paid EMS personnel with the town in effect since 2009. 

“Over the past six months, the Mayor and Council have done all that we can within our legal and moral authority to protect the rights of the paid EMS personnel who have been working as leased employees under the terms of an agreement enacted January 1, 2009,” said Berlin Mayor Gee Williams in a press release. “The fire company has been unsuccessful in its attempts to prevent some volunteer members from harassing Berlin’s paid EMS employees in the workplace that the town firmly believes is both unacceptable and illegal.”

Charlene Sharpe, delmarvanow.com (updated article):

Joe Moore, attorney for the Berlin Fire Company, denies that the town’s decision to cut funding is due to harassment allegations. He said the issue between the town and the fire company relates to control.

“The sole matter of disagreement is related to who will control the operations and scheduling matters for Emergency Medical Service for the town of Berlin,” he said. “We did not accede that control to them.”

Paramedics alleged they were being harassed by both fellow EMS employees and Berlin Fire Company volunteers regarding sexual orientation, race and sex. One individual was repeatedly subjected to slurs relating to his perceived sexual orientation, according to a town official who did not wish to be named.

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NIOSH reports: LODDs of Asheville, NC’s Capt. Jeff Bowen & Baltimore Co., MD’s FF Mark Falkenhan.

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NIOSH released reports into the line of duty deaths of two firefighters whose deaths we  covered. Below are the reports and some related links. Both men’s names will be added to the National Fallen Firefighters Memorial during Memorial Weekend, October 6 & 7.

January 19, 2011, Baltimore County, MD, Firefighter Mark Falkenhan:

Read NIOSH report

ATF modeling of fire

ATF report

Baltimore County report

Radio traffic

 July 28, 2011, Asheville, NC, Captain Jeff Bowen:

Read NIOSH report

The loss of Captain Jeff Bowen, the inside story from Firefighter Jay Bettencourt Part 1

The loss of Captain Jeff Bowen, the inside story from Firefighter Jay Bettencourt Part 2

Earlier coverage of this fire here, here & here

Firefighter Jay Bettencourt receives firefighter of the year 

DC Fire & EMS Department report on vacant house fire that injured five firefighters. Read entire report.

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Click here to download the entire report

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Click here for fireground audio from this fire

Click here for previous coverage of story

Last week the DC Fire & EMS Department released its internal report into the April 8, 2011 fire at 811 48th Place, NE that injured five firefighters. Earlier this week we pointed you to a Washington Times article about the fire. Now the entire report is available for downloading (note that it is a fairly large file).

This is the fire that critically burned Firefighter Chuck Ryan who was with Rescue Squad 3. Firefighter Ryan is now back on the job in DC.

You may note another familiar name in the previous coverage of this fire. Robert Alvarado was a lieutenant at the time he was burned. Alvarado has since been demoted to sergeant following his public challenge of Chief Kenneth Ellerbe’s uniform policy (click here).

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Video: ATF modeling with radio traffic from MD apartment fire that killed Firefighter Mark Falkenhan.

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Previous STATter911.com coverage

Read Baltimore County Fire Department report on Firefighter Falkenhan’s death

Read ATF report

This is the video (in three parts) the ATF produced to accompany its engineering analysis utilizing Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) of the fire that killed Lutherville VFC Firefighter Mark Falkenhan last year. There are links above to the ATF report by Adam St. John P.E., Fire Protection Engineer ATF Fire Research Laboratory and the internal report the Baltimore County Fire Department released in March. The modeling is matched with the fireground and dispatch radio traffic.

Description with video:

This video summarizes the ATF Fire Research Laboratory’s Engineering Analysis of the fire that occurred at 30 Dowling Circle on January 19th, 2011.  ATF Fire Protection Engineers were asked to utilize engineering analysis methods, including computer fire modeling, to assist with determining the route of fire spread and the events that led to the firefighter MAYDAY and subsequent Line of Duty Death of Firefighter Mark Falkenhan. 

Inspector General says fireboat capability in nation’s capital obsolete. Says DC Fire & EMS Department has no plans to replace 50-year-old vessel.

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Metropolitan Police Department surveillance vide of Fireboat John H. Glenn Jr. being struck by the Spirit of Washington on January 31, 2009.

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Read about Melbourne, Australia’s fireboat problem

Last week we showed you the impact of a major city failing to provide adequate firefighting cability on its waterfront. The bad publicity from the fire department being unable to extinguish a burning yacht at its Dockside community has forced government officials in Melbournce, Australia to address the issue. In Washington, DC, an IG investigation has focused on a similar lack of resources and warns the city may not be prepared for a major waterfront emergency.

The Washington Examiner reports that the DC Fire and EMS Department’s 50-year-old Fireboat John H. Glenn Jr. has been neglected and is obsolete. Reporter Liz Farmer cites a preliminary report from the Office of The Inspector General that indicates the diminished capabilites impact the nation’s capital’s abililty to repond to a terrorist attack on water.

In 2003 I took a ride on the John H. Glenn Jr. during an ice-breaking mission.

The report also says the fire department has not made plans to replace the boat. FDNY launched the boat in 1962 and DC put it in service in 1977.

More from The Washington Examiner:

 When asked about the report, at-large Councilman Phil Mendelson, said the findings showed the District did “not have the same capabilities” as other major cities. The report notes Boston and San Francisco both applied for federal grant money to update their fleets with boats that are faster and pump twice as much water. 

“There’s no reason why, as the nation’s capital, that we don’t have the best in any apparatus for fire and rescue,” said Mendelson, whose committee oversees the city’s Fire and EMS Department.

 The department has until Monday to issue its response to the inspector general and a spokesman last week did not return requests for comment

On January 31, 2009 the Glenn’s hull was severely damaged when it was struck by the dinner cruise ship Spirit of Washington (see video above). The fireboat is the primary vessel used for ice breaking on the Potomac during the winter months.

Read entire article from The Washington Examiner

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Significant injury report: Findings from Huntingtown, Maryland fire that injured 10 firefighters.

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Image from video as air horns were sounded.

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Click here to read report

Previous coverage of this fire, including additional video & pictures

A year ago this past Monday 10 Southern Maryland firefighters were injured during a house fire in Calvert County. Four received significant burns. The fire was in a large home at 3380 Soper Road in Huntingtown. Calvert County firefighters were joined by firefighters from Prince George’s County, Anne Arundel County and Charles County.

On Thursday, Chief Jonathan Riffe of the Huntingtown VFD released the report looking into the events of that fire.

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LODD report: Read Baltimore County investigation into death of Lutherville VFC Firefighter Mark Falkenhan.

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Click here to read entire report

Previous STATter911.com coverage

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Excerpt from the Executive Summary:

In fairness to those units involved in this incident, the investigating team had the advantage of examining this incident over the period of several months. Furthermore, given the size and nature of the event, and the fact that arriving crews were met with serious fire conditions and several residents trapped and in immediate danger, all personnel should be commended for their efforts for performing several rescues which prevented an even greater tragedy. The team did not identify a particular primary reason for FF Falkenhan’s death. What were identified were many secondary issues involving but not limited to crew integrity, incident command, strategy and tactics, and communications. These issues are identified and discussed, and recommendations are made in appropriate sections of the report, as well as in a consolidated format in the Appendix.

Some of the issues identified in this report may require some type of change to current practices, policies, procedures or equipment. Most, however, do not. Specifically, the analysis and recommendations regarding Incident Command and Strategy and Tactics show that if current policies and procedures are adhered to, the opportunity for catastrophic problems may be reduced.

Mark Falkenhan was a well-respected and experienced firefighter. He died performing his duties during a very complex incident with severe fire conditions and unique fire behavior coupled with the immediate need to perform multiple rescues of victims in imminent danger. It would be easy if one particular failure of the system could be identified as the cause of this tragedy. We could fix it and move on. Unfortunately it is not that simple. No incident is “routine”. Mark’s death and this report reinforce that fact.

Image from report showing conditions on arrival.

UPDATE: Complete LODD report from San Francisco Fire Department now available,

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Previous coverage of this story here, here, herehere & here

Last Friday we told you the San Francisco Fire Department released its official report into the deaths of Lt. Vincent Perez and Firefighter/Paramedic Anthony Valerio. At the time, only a summary was available online. Now you can read the entire report:

Safety Investigation Report for Berkeley Way Fire  (June 2, 2011)

Cal OSHA fines San Francisco FD for two in, two out & more in fire that killed two firefighters. Chief disputes findings.

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Previous coverage of this story herehere & here

California's Department of Industrial Relations' Division of Occupational Safety and Health has issued fines in connection with the fire that killed Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio, 53 on June 2. Both the agency and Chief Joanne Hayes-White say that the violations were not a direct cause of the firefighters' deaths. Fire officials go further and are disputing some of Cal OSHA's findings.

From Vic Lee at KGO-TV:

Cal OSHA issued four citations — three of them categorized as serious — and said personnel located outside the house did not maintain communications with the two crewmembers of Engine 26.

The fire department says it will appeal all the citations.

"We have documentation to prove that these citations are not based on what we think happened up there," said Asst. Dept. Chief Jose Velo.

From Jaxon Van Derbeken at sfgate.com:

In recommending that the Fire Department be fined $21,000, the state investigators also said the department had violated state rules requiring that two firefighters be designated outside to assist any two firefighters who venture into a life-threatening environment.

The state also cited the Fire Department for an incident – evidently before the fatal flareup – in which an unidentified battalion chief ventured into the burning building alone, without keeping in contact with Perez and Valerio. That was also deemed a serious violation of safety rules.

"These are serious in that they had protocols in place, but they weren't following them," said Erika Monterroza, spokeswoman for the worker safety agency. "There's no question that a lack of communications was a big issue here. The investigator found there was a breakdown there.

NIOSH says Bridgeport FD failed to respond to mayday calls in double LODDs. Many failures cited in deaths of Lt. Steve Velasquez & FF Michel Baik.

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Read entire NIOSH report

Previous STATter911.com coverage of this story

Coverage from FirefighterNation/FireRescue Magazine

The view from Firegeezer

Fire timeline from Connecticut Post

BRIDGEPORT, Conn. (AP) – A federal investigation into a house fire last summer that killed two firefighters has determined that city fire officials failed to effectively respond to mayday calls.

The report Wednesday by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health concluded that several factors contributed to the deaths in Bridgeport. It notes that an incident safety officer and rapid intervention team were not readily available on scene, and that ineffective mayday procedures and training also were factors.

 

In February, the state Department of Labor cited the fire department for serious safety violations, determining that among other problems, the department failed to perform tests on firefighters' breathing gas tanks, failed to conduct medical evaluations and ensure firefighters were fit.

Fire Chief Brian Rooney wouldn't comment on the federal report because the state fire marshal's office is still investigating.

Lt. Steven Velasquez and firefighter Michael Baik died in the July 24 fire.

"This has been a trying and difficult time for everyone involved in the deaths of our two firefighters – their families and friends, their fellow firefighters and the entire city," Rooney said in a statement. "We continue to offer our heartfelt thoughts and prayers to the families of Lt. Steven Velasquez and Firefighter Michel Baik as we work our way through the process."

An incident commander had to monitor two different radio channels by using two different handheld radios, the new federal report said.

"At times, radio transmissions on one channel were missed or unanswered because the (incident commander) was transmitting on the opposite channel," the report states.

Fire officials thought they heard what sounded like a mayday sent by one of the firefighters, leading to a discussion among them, but the possible mayday transmission was not confirmed with dispatch, according to the report. 


 

Mayday is an international distress signal firefighters send when they become lost, trapped or in other trouble.

The fire department had a mayday procedure but it did not test the ability of firefighters, dispatchers and incident commanders to manage such incidents, the report found.

"In this incident, mayday transmissions were missed and not acknowledged," the report said. "It is not known why the dispatch center did not hear or acknowledge the maydays or why the mayday tone was not used appropriately."

The report also said fire departments should train firefighters in air management techniques. Some firefighters had left the building to change their air bottles, but both victims were found with depleted cylinders, according to the report.

An incident safety officer arrived more than 20 minutes after the initial dispatch because the incident occurred after hours, the report found. Fire departments should ensure a separate incident safety officer is appointed at each structure fire with the initial dispatch, the agency said.

Inspector General’s report says DC deputy fire chief violated city rules in controversial fire engine & ambulance donation. Read entire report.

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Above is Part 1 of the April 1, 2009  hearing. Click for Part 2, Part 3 and Part 4.

 Read just released OIG report

Read previous report by the Committee for Public Safety & the Judiciary

Read previous report by the Committee for Government Operations & the Environment

Click here and scroll down for earlier coverage of the Sosua controversy

Above is the video from what I believe was one of the strangest DC City Council hearings I had covered in my 25 years as a TV reporter. The contentious April 1, 2009 hearing before Phil Mendelson's Committee for Public Safety and the Judiciary had then DC Fire & EMS Department Chief Dennis Rubin and his staff on the hot seat about a used city fire engine and ambulance that had been donated to the city of Sosua in the Dominican Republic. Trying to get to the bottom of this supposed good deed by the administration of Mayor Adrian Fenty was not an easy task. A series of reports were issued. Links for some of those reports are above.

Now the latest report is out. It is from the DC Office of the Inspector General. Here's how the Washington Examiner's Freeman Klopott described the findings:

Top members of the Adrian Fenty administration violated District regulations when they developed plans to donate a used D.C.-owned fire truck to a Dominican Republic city, a D.C. inspector general investigation has concluded.

"The lack of proper oversight allowed private parties … inappropriately to influence the activities of District government employees," the inspector general wrote. "This further resulted in a waste of District government resources."  

One of those cited for violating city rules is a deputy fire chief. Here's a summary from the report:

B. The Deputy Fire Chiefs Conduct

Fire truck #S-104 and ambulance #S-671, which ultimately were designated for donation to Sosua, were not identified for decommissioning and disposal until after the Nonprofit 2 Founder rejected fire truck #S-194 and the first ambulance. The Deputy Fire Chief, without regard to District decommission and disposal procedures, selected vehicles that had not yet been identified for decommission and disposal and expedited the process so that the vehicles were available for donation in less than 1 month, instead ofwithin 60-75 days as he initially indicated. 19

Accordingly, the OIG finds that he used his position as a FEMS employee to benefit a private interest and expedited the decommissioning and disposal of the vehicles without following proper procedure.

After being invited by the former DMPED DOD to a Super Bowl party in Sosua, the Deputy Fire: Chief informed FEMS that he had scheduled training for SosUa fire officials. This resulted in the • Deputy Fire Chief obtaining authorized paid leave from FEMS for his time in Sosua. He then traveled to Sosua, at District government expense (costing more than $800 for his airfare and per ' diem), accepted a free meal and transportation from Sosua officials, and accepted a plaque from Dajabon officials. Therefore, he violated the DPM by accepting gifts from prohibited sources because Sosa and Dajabon were attempting to obtain property from the District, specifically FEMS.

Accordingly, the issues of whether the Deputy Fire Chief violated DPM § 1803.1 (a)(1) (Using public office for private gain); § 1803.1 (a)(2) (Giving preferential treatment to any person); § 1803.1 (a)(3) (Impeding government efficiency or economy); § 1803.1 (a)(4) (Losing complete independence or impartiality); § 1803.1 (a)(5) (Making a government decision outside official . channels); § 1803.1 (a)(6) (Affecting adversely the confidence ofthe public in the integrity of government); § 1803.2 (A District government employee shall not solicit or accept, either directly or through the intercession ofothers, any gift from a prohibited source); and § 1803.6 (An employee shall not accept a gift, present, or decoration from a foreign government), are SUBSTANTIATED.  

Who to believe: Judge in Rhode Island & professor in Georgia come to different conclusions about a connection between safety & firefighter staffing.

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Woonsocket Fire Department in action at a six-alarm mill fire in February. Video from ProvidenceFireVideos.com.

It is interesting how two different news stories that came across my computer screen today show opposite conclusions on the same issue. One story is about the ruling of a judge in Rhode Island who found no connection between the safety of firefighters and the browning out of Woonsocket Fire Department's Ladder 1. The other is a study by the University of Georgia that discovered under-resourcing is among the four major causes of firefighter fatalities.

In Rhode Island, IAFF Local 732 had taken the city of Woonsocket to court over the closing of the ladder truck when a shift had fewer than 26 firefighters. The case ran on for more than two-months. Here are excerpts from the article by Andrew Metcalf at the Woonsocket Patch:

Superior Court Judge Bennett R. Gallo ruled that there was no public safety risk to firefighters or residents in Woonsocket as a result of the removal of Ladder Truck 1 and the reduction of the minimum amount of firefighters on duty from 26 to 23 on Wednesday afternoon.

"On the evidence presented,” said Gallo, “I’m unable to discern any measurable decrease in the firefighting capabilities of the Woonsocket Fire Department or any increase risk to the firefighters of Woonsocket or to the public regarding,” the removal of Ladder 1 and the reduction in manpower.

Daniel Kinder, the primary lawyer for the city, stated in his closing remarks that the experience of the past three months proved that safety was not a concern.   He said that since the policy to remove Ladder 1 from service whenever less than 26 firefighters reported for duty was implemented on January 30, there has been no firefighter injuries, no change in firefighter response times, no harm to the public and no harm to any mutual aid firefighter.

In Georgia, what is being called a comprehensive UGA study, has revealed patterns in firefighter fatalities. According to a press release from UGA, "Researchers in the UGA College of Public Health found that cultural factors in the work environment that promote getting the job done as quickly as possible with whatever resources available lead to an increase in line-of-duty firefighter fatalities."

The four major causes identified in the study are "under-resourcing, inadequate preparation for adverse events during operations, incomplete adoption of incident command procedures and sub-optimal personnel readiness."

Here is what the release said about under-resourcing:

Many of the recommendations can be traced to a lack of finances, said  (co-author David) DeJoy. Not only does under-resourcing affect the ability of a fire department to acquire innovative technology, it can lead to a shortage of personnel at a fire, compromising rapid intervention and the ability to maintain command and control functions during operations, he said.

The study is published in the May edition of of the journal Accident Analysis and Prevention. It examined data gathered from 189 NIOSH firefighter fatality investigations for five years beginning in 2004. 

So who are you going to believe, the judge or the professor?

Video: Mayday simulator for Prince George’s County, Maryland.

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Read report on Herrington Drive fire

More from Backstep Firefighter

The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department made the video above to show off its Mobile Mayday Simulator. The simulator was developed in part as a reaction to lessons learned from a report into the April, 2009 fire at 87 Herrington Drive in Largo that left a firefighter critically injured. PGFD PIO Mark Brady issued a press release with details on the simulator and its development. Here are excerpts:

The Technical Services Battalion, under the command of Major Adon Snyder, has developed a mobile “mayday” simulator, accompanied by a classroom lecture, which can be easily brought to any Fire/EMS station or training facility. A 40-minute classroom session with power point presentation and practical evolution comprise this training program. The practical portion starts with participants raising their heart rate to about 140, a rate consistent with response and initial activity at an incident scene. It is also the heart rate where decision making could be adversely affected. Raising the heart rate is accomplished by participants donning full personal protective equipment (PPE) and self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) then carries a stand-pipe pack for approximately 5 to 10 minutes. The firefighter then places their cloth covered face piece on and begins to breathe air. The firefighter, with no visibility, is then instructed to follow a 100 foot section of hoseline. The firefighter follows the hoseline and is led up a ramp and then up steps to a simulated second floor and then experience a sudden floor collapse.

The firefighter, following General Orders and valuable lessons learned in the classroom portion of the drill, must then demonstrate the correct survival skills and mayday procedure.

The mobile mayday simulator was constructed inside of a fire department utility box truck. The conversion of the interior box of the utility truck includes elements required for participants to ascend steps onto an upper floor landing and a collapsible floor which will allow participants to feel the unexpected jolting experience of a floor collapse. The firefighter has been previously instructed to ensure their SCBA and PPE are still in place and then transmit, by way of their portable radio, a correct MAYDAY message.

The drill is designed not only for firefighters but also incident commanders that will receive the radio mayday message and act accordingly. Scenarios can be modified to include non-working radios, dislodged facepiece, etc. The mobile mayday simulator has been used at select stations in order to collect data and evaluate the program. The program has received very positive feedback from both evaluators and participants. A train-the-trainer program is now being developed and will soon be made available to all personnel.

PGFD report into 2009 fire that critically burned Firefighter/Paramedic Daniel McGown now made public. Read the entire report.

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Jim Davis has written us an email insisting we tell you the above video, from a WUSA9.com video player, that he sold to 9NEWSNOW/WUSA9.com, was shot by him.  

Read entire 103 page report 

Earlier coverage from STATter911.com here, here, here, here and here.

The Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department has publicly released its Safety and Investigative Team (SIT) report from the fire that critically injured Firefighter/Paramedic Daniel McGown. Two other firefighters were hurt in the April 8, 2009 fire at 87 Herrington Drive. PGFD Spokesman Mark Brady says that SIT completed its investigation in December 2009, but until now it had not been made public.       

According to Brady, the following issues were identified:       

  • Failure to establish an initial water supply
  • Incomplete size-up reports
  • Improper tactics
  • Lack of company-level supervision
  • Lack of effective crew integrity
  • Inadequate communication on the fire ground
  • Failure to provide adequate ventilation
  • Lack of training and experience in fire fighter survival skills

Here’s more from the PGFD press release:       

From the findings of the investigation, the SIT developed a total of nine (9) recommendations. Five (5) of these recommendations were identified as “primary recommendations” as they relate directly to actions, inactions, or factors that contributed in a direct way to the resulting injuries. The remaining four (4) recommendations were identified as “ancillary recommendations” because they were discovered in the course of the investigation and identified as issues, but did not contribute directly to the resulting injuries.
 
Prince George’s County Acting Fire Chief Marc S. Bashoor commented on the public release of this document by saying, “In the interest of communicating the lessons learned to prevent occurrences of a similar nature, I am officially releasing this report. Lessons learned by our department can be of value to others in preventing injury and death to firefighters across the country.”  He concluded by saying, “I would like to thank the team that compiled this report.  One of our most challenging tasks as an organization is to pause and conduct a through and honest critique of ourselves in an incident such as this.”
  

Andrew Pantelis, President of the Prince George’s County Professional Fire Fighters and Paramedics Association, IAFF Local 1619, stated, “The intent of such reports are not to cast blame or second guess split second decisions that are made on the fire ground but rather to provide a tool for members to use to apply in training and future incidents.”        

California chief’s past comes back to haunt him. District attorney makes allegations over how Central Calaveras FRPD’s Joe Piccinini handled his previous job.

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Central Calaveras Fire and Rescue Protection District

Anderson Fire Protection District

Redding.com editorial on the issue

Joe Piccinini, the chief of the Central Calaveras Fire and Rescue Protection District in Calaveras County, California is under fire following a report that has been released about Piccinini’s handling of his previous job. On July 1, 2009 Piccinini resigned as chief of the Anderson Fire Protection District in Shasta County, a job he took in October, 2007. He had been placed on administrative leave before resigning.

The report, from the Shasta County District Attorney’s Office, makes numerous allegations about Chief Piccinini. But no criminal charges are being filed because the statute of limitations to file charges has expired. So far, his bosses in Calaveras County are sticking by him.

From an article by Ryan Sabalow at Redding.com:

In a report released today (Monday), Shasta County Deputy District Attorney Erin Dervin wrote that there was evidence Joe Piccinini had given alcohol to minors numerous times, driven drunk in fire department vehicles and had also used them to remodel his home.

Piccinini’s Gold River attorney, Daniel Thompson, said he’s not surprised the charges weren’t filed.

He said the investigation was based on “hearsay and internal witness testimony” amid a “tide of bias or political agenda.”

Both the Shasta County Grand Jury and an investigator the department’s board hired to look into the allegations found that employees had accused Piccinini of watching pornography on his work computers.

He was also accused of getting publicly drunk in uniform, berating and sexually harassing employees, misusing district property, funds and staff for personal gain, purchasing items without authorization and knowingly furnishing alcohol to a minor.

Among the allegations was that Piccinini had forged a first responder certification from his former employer, the Tulsa, Okla., Fire Department to get a job in Anderson.

Tulsa authorities reported that records the department had were in “shambles” or “garbage” or a “mess,” Dervin wrote.

“We certainly couldn’t prove any fraud beyond a reasonable doubt,” Dervin said.

 From Recordnet.com:

Deputy District Attorney Erin Dervin wrote in the report that numerous witnesses quoted Piccinini as saying to the minors: “If you’re old enough to die for your community, you’re old enough to drink.”

Piccinini did not immediately respond to a phone message left Tuesday afternoon at Central Calaveras Fire and Rescue Protection District headquarters.

Central Calaveras district board President Bill Schmiett said he had been aware of the allegations against Piccinini since before his district hired Piccinini.

“When we hired him, he told us all about his travails in Anderson Fire Department,” Schmiett said. “We had him super background investigated.”

By the time the Redding Police Department finished the criminal investigation at the request of Anderson police – to avoid an appearance of a conflict of interest – the one-year statute of limitations had expired, according to the report.

An answer: We now know who turned off the sprinkler system during the standoff & fire at Roseville, California’s Westfield Galleria.

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Read entire City of Roseville Westfield Galleria Arson After-Action Report

Read previous coverage

You may recall that Mike Ward (AKA FossilMedic) was among the first to wonder aloud about the sprinkler system during the dramatic October 21 standoff and fire inside the Westfield Galleria shopping center in Roseville, California. Word soon came that there was an order from police to shut down the system. Now, an after action report by the City of Roseville indicates that wasn’t exactly accurate.

Here are some of the details from Ward Koppel, KXTV-TV:

A report released early Friday morning by the City of Roseville says that a Westfield Galleria at Roseville employee shut off the mall’s fire sprinkler system. Thursday, a Judge denied the Placer County District Attorney’s request to issue a gag order to prevent the release of the report, clearing the way for the release.

The “City of Roseville Westfield Galleria Arson After-Action Report” summarizes the October 21 incident. It details the actions of all agencies involved, and includes a timeline of what happened at the mall. It concludes with a narrative of the lessons learned. Throughout the report and timeline, it is noted that concerns about about an armed man and an explosive device being inside the mall were factors in decisions being made.

According to the timeline in the report, at 10:36 a.m., a Westfield employee turned off a fire sprinkler valve. The employee says he did so at the direction of law enforcement. Neither police or fire were aware of the shutoff. The reports says, an investigation revealed that the employee was told by a UPS employee inside the mall that police wanted the sprinklers turned off. Neither the Westfield employee nor the UPS employee could recall or identify the individual who made that request. The timeline shows that at 11:41 a.m., the fire prevention officer was advised that the sprinklers were shut off. Ten minutes later, the system was turned back on, and police inside the mall report the sprinklers were going off again.

At 12:02 p.m. heavy fire was reported in the attic space above GameStop. Nine minutes later police detained suspect Alexander Piggee. The timeline between 12:13 p.m. and 1:50 p.m. has numerous mentions of concerns about the safety of sending firefighters into the building because of the continued concern about an explosive device being inside. At 1:50 p.m. all police officers in the mall are evacuated due to heavy smoke and fire conditions and firefighters focus on putting out the fire from the outside. The fire was declared contained at 6 p.m.

The “Summary and Lessons Learned” portion of the report concludes that the fire, the size of the mall, the potentially armed man, and concerns about explosives being inside made this the “most complex fire and police response” in Roseville history. It notes that communication on scene was good, but could be improved by immediately placing the police and fire command posts in the same location. Key personnel need to wear clothing that clearly identifies their role. The report also addresses the need for better use of protective equipment and improvements in support for an ongoing, fluid situation.

The Placer County District Attorney had requested a gag order to prevent the release of the report. The District Attorney said the release could make it more difficult for Alexander Piggee to get a fair trial. Piggee’s attorney, and the media opposed the gag order. A Judge Thursday denied the request to delay the release of the report.