New report calls DC ‘s water infrastructure “highly questionable”. Says water authority and fire department need to do a better job on larger fires.
Image of Adams Mill Rd. fire on October 1, 2007 from Vito Maggiolo, DC Fire & EMS photographer
Read executive summary from WASA report
Details of close call on roof at October 1st fire, along with raw video
Pictures and story on overnight hydrant testing near fire scene
A new report says it “will require millions of dollars and at least two decades of continual effort” to fix what ails the water system infrastructure in the Nation’s Capital. DC Fire & EMS called on a large group of outside consultants, supervised by J. Gordon Routley, to look at what went wrong during an apartment building fire on October 1st in Adams Morgan. The report was released by Mayor Adrian Fenty’s office on Friday.
WASA released its own report painting a very different picture. The executive summary of that report points out only three areas in the city where smaller water mains should have a major impact on firefighting operations.
In the days following the fire on Adams Mill Road, DC Fire & EMS Chief Dennis Rubin complained about the inadequate water supply and a poor response from DC Water and Sewer Authority (WASA) General Manager Jerry Johnson and his staff. The report found problems with the response by both agencies.
According to the report, “the delay in establishing an effective fire flow allowed the fire to burn spectacularly for more than an hour; however it did not result in significantly greater loss to the building and contents”.
At the same time, tests conducted on October 18th showed “that the water mains and hydrants within the Adams Morgan neighborhood are unable to deliver the needed fire flow”.
Overnight hydrant testing in Adams Morgan on October 18, 2007
Firefighters first discovered the water problem as they switched from an offensive to a defensive attack. Here’s how it is described in the report:
The switch to defensive strategy was ineffective because the hydrants in the immediate vicinity could not supply the required volume of water. Attempts were made to supplement the water supply by connecting pumpers to additional hydrants; however the hydrants that were selected were connected to the same grid and could not deliver a significant increase in the fire flow. The water supply could not support more than two effective master streams simultaneously.
To get an adequate water supply to the burning building, the fire department finally put down parallel, 4-inch hose lines, more than 2500-feet, to hydrants at Connecticut Avenue and Calvert Street, NW. WASA has said there was plenty of water available much closer, near 18th Street and Columbia Road. The overnight testing confirmed WASA’s claim, but the report says because of inadequate maps of the water system provided by WASA, firefighters did not know that information.
From the report:
DC Fire & EMS has very little information to identify reliable alternative water supplies for this type of situation. The water system maps are outdated, difficult to interpret and lack critical information. The hydrants have not been flow tested and marked to indicate flow capacity or water main size and the WASA representative who responded to the scene could not provide the necessary information.
The reports calls on WASA to upgrade its ability to provide information about the water system and says that “an experienced WASA engineer should always be available to respond to major fires or water outages”.
WASA says fire flow is adequate for most of the city
WASA conducted its own analysis of the city’s small diameter water mains. This is the criteria used in that study:
The fire protection guideline criteria used for the analysis was based upon benchmarks of other utility water systems for various land use classes and as directed by DC WASA in the absence of other criteria in the DC Code. Section 2 of the report includes details related to the Fire Protection Guidelines. These guidelines specify a minimum fire flow availability of: 1) 1000 gpm within a 1000 foot radius of all portions of the water system with public fire hydrants; and, 2) 2000 gpm within a 1000 foot radius of those areas of the water system with public fire hydrants based on land use classification fire flow requirements.
Based on that WASA believes there is no emergency with the water system. It found only three locations where the standards weren’t met. Two of those are described as being undeveloped areas. The third is a large apartment complex in Northeast. WASA says it is working to correct the problem at Mayfair Parkside.
Report details close call
For the first time, a detailed timeline of the events at the 4-alarm-fire have been made public. The timeline chronicles the radio transmissions from the first arriving crews battling the fire on the roof of the building. The firefighters from three companies were briefly trapped, after fire spread on the top floor and came through the bulkhead door the firefighters had used to access the roof.
At 1:49:50, about 25-minutes after the call was dispatched, Engine 11 reported, “Also chief (saws operating in the background) looks like the bucket might be able to help us out… the roof is getting spongy and ah, we’re losing it, we might as well get off the roof.”
It was one of a number of radio transmissions as crews attempted to get ladders in place to rescue the firefighters. Video shows a 45-foot extension ladder, topped by a roof ladder, being raised to side C of the building. But at 2:00:45, Engine 11’s officer says, “We had to make our way down the stairwell, interior stairwell with 2 lines, but we got everybody off the roof.”
Report calls for fire department water supply improvements
Even if firefighters were aware of the closer main that could have supplied the needed water, the report finds other issues:
It would have been necessary to connect two pumpers to each hydrant (tandem pumping) in order to make full use of the flow that was available. The procedure that is normally used to connect a DC Fire and EMS pumper to a hydrant limits the flow to a
pproximately 1,000 gallons per minute. The flow from a hydrant to a single pumper could be increased by using a larger diameter hose and a less restricted intake connection or by connecting additional hoses. The maximum capacity of the hydrant could be utilized if two pumpers were connected in tandem.
The report says that the DC Fire & EMS Department isn’t geared toward quickly supplying the water needed for handling larger fires:
The water supply tactics that are generally employed by DC Fire & EMS Department are designed for rapid offensive attack using limited volumes of water – generally 500 gpm or less. The standard operating procedures are designed for fast action as opposed to setting-up for large volume operations.
The report recommends more training at the company level and for officers on “high volume tactics”. The report also has a suggestion on how to move to a defensive operation:
When switching from offensive to defensive operations, specific companies should be assigned to establish high volume water supplies. (This option is generally more effective than ordering companies that are already in position and operating to switch from offensive to defensive operations.)
The report says the current arrangement of a 4-inch soft sleeve, pre-connected to a front intake, works well for an offensive operation, but “produces excessive friction loss that limits the volume of water that can be obtained from a hydrant in a high flow situation”.
The report calls for fully staffing the water supply companies which are currently activated by splitting crews or calling in off-duty personnel.
