Remembering two young firefighters killed 20-years-ago in Catlett, VA. Mark Miller & Matthew Smith died when fire engine was hit by Amtrak train.

Mark Miller and Matthew Smith.

Catlett Volunteer Fire & Rescue website

Read USFA report on the collision

Inside the new Catlett Volunteer Fire & Rescue building is a plaque dedicated to Mark Miller and Matthew Smith, two young volunteers killed in the line of duty. When I saw the plaque at the firehouse dedication last October it brought back memories of being sent to the old Catlett firehouse a few days after their deaths trying to make sense of the tragedy that had devastated this rural community in Fauquier County, Virginia.

Yesterday, the volunteers of Catlett paused again to remember Miller and Smith on the 20th anniversary of their deaths.

Firefighters Miller and Smith were two of the five firefighters aboard Catlett’s Wagon 7 as it was dispatched to a vehicle fire on Route 28 south of Catlett just before 7:30 PM on September 28, 1989. Less than 10 minutes after the dispatch, Miller and Smith were dead, the three other firefighters seriously injured, the fire engine was in pieces, an Amtrak passenger train with two locomotives and 16 cars had derailed, 57 of the 399 passengers were hurt and there was fire on the tracks.

Wagon 7 was struck at an unprotected grade crossing as the engine was trying to get back to a driveway it had overshot on the way to the vehicle fire.

The United States Fire Administration looked at the collision as part of its Technical Report Series. Here is a description of the collision from the report:

The event recorder aboard the locomotive indicated that the train was traveling about 77 miles per hour before the collision occurred. The engineer stated that he observed the fire apparatus and believed that Wagon 7 was going to stop at the crossing. When the engine entered the crossing, the engineer applied the brakes on “emergency” and sounded the horn. The engineer reported that the firefighter riding in the front passenger seat of Wagon 7 never looked at the train before the collision.

The brunt of the collision was directed at the rear of the vehicle, at about the rear axle. When the collision occurred, the cab and chassis of the Catlett pumper rotated counterclockwise 450 degrees and came to rest about 80 feet southeast of the crossing. The lead locomotive stopped about 965 feet past the crossing with the left side of Wagon 7’s hose body wrapped around its front end. Most equipment and the rear bodywork were scattered along the collision area. Gasoline fires that broke out near the second locomotive and several derailed cars were extinguished by other firefighters responding to the emergency. The primary fuel for these fires was from the fuel tank aboard Wagon 7, which ruptured in the crash.

Also from the report:

The crossing where the collision occurred was not equipped with any automatic warning equipment such as flashing lights or gates. The only warning was a standard cross buck (railroad crossing) sign. The driveway led from Route 28 to a private residence.

Even though it was dusk, the weather conditions at the time of the accident were clear. The 59-foot section of the driveway from the highway to the rail crossing had an 11.9 degree grade. But the tracks were straight and there were no visual obstructions that prevented the driver of Wagon 7 from seeing the approaching train. NTSB investigators estimate that the railroad tracks are visible for approximately 3,700 feet in the direction the train came from.

Driver Stress

The driver of Wagon 7 was a 24-year-old member of the department who had several years of experience in operating large vehicles. He had undergone training by the fire company in operation of the vehicle and had been driving Wagon 7 for about three years. Postmortem interviews and toxicological tests revealed no evidence of any physical impairment.

In addition to normal stressors experienced during emergency response, the actions of the driver of Wagon 7 indicated he was undoubtedly experiencing added stress for several reasons. First, the engine left the station without an officer on board, contrary to department policy. The chief’s radio transmissions asking “who is in charge” and the indirect response from the crew of Wagon 7 would indicate that the driver was under added stress from the initial moments of the response. Wagon 7 radioed the chief to request that any additional apparatus be held in the station until they arrived at the scene to verify the nature of the call.

A second contributing factor, which may have been affected by the first, was the fact that Wagon 7 missed the turn for the driveway leading to the fire and traveled approximately 1.5 miles past the fire before asking for directions from Fauquier County communications. When Wagon 7 requested directions to the fire, the chief and Tanker 7 responded to the scene. Despite leaving the station four minutes after Wagon 7, the chief arrived on the scene before any other apparatus and reported that the vehicle was fully involved. Upon hearing this, it is likely that the crew of Wagon 7 focused their attention on “redeeming themselves” by performing satisfactorily in reaching and extinguishing the fire. The tanker and the engine approached the scene at the same time. Tanker 7 stopped to allow Wagon 7 to enter the driveway first. The heightened level of stress on the driver of Wagon 7 is indicated by the fact that as he approached the driveway leading to the location of the fire call, he overshot the turn and had to back the vehicle to make the turn into the driveway. In recreations of the maneuver with a similar apparatus, it took 16 seconds to properly align the apparatus to move up the driveway.

At this point, the car fire was visible to the driver of Wagon 7 and the crew probably focused all their attention on reaching the fire. This is reinforced by the statements of the Amtrak engineer, who stated that the placed the train’s brakes on emergency and sounded the horn when he realized that the vehicle was not going to stop. As the train headed toward the pumper, the engineer stated that the front seat passenger never looked at the train, although the passengers in the rear jump seats did observe the approaching train.

“Although some level of stress can enhance human performance, excessive stress can lead to substandard performance. When a person’s arousal level is unduly increased by stressors, the focus of attention is
narrowed to performance of the task perceived to be the most important, while the quality of the performance of any peripheral task(s) deteriorates.”

Interestingly, the Catlett Volunteer Fire Department had responded to a car struck by a train at a similar crossing several months before this incident, which would indicate that they should have been aware of the dangers associated with such crossings.